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Abstract 
Economic integration is the establishment of a unified economic area where consumers and 
producers of different nations transact freely in a single market. Using the experience of the 
European Union, this essay offers a bird’s–eye view of the trade–offs encountered when 
supranational structures pursuing collective objectives of integration may infringe on national 
sovereignty. The range of issues examined include: (A) Determination of policy with multiple 
veto players. (B) The advantage and disadvantages from centralising policy making. (C) The 
welfare effects of a customs union from changing the flows of trade and factors of production 
across different countries. (D) The costs and benefits from adopting a single currency and its 
consequences for budgetary policy.  
1 Definition 
Economic integration is the creation of a unified economic area where firms and consumers from 
different nations buy and sell goods and services in a single market and owners of capital and labour 
can deploy their resources in any economic activity anywhere in the area. Integration encompasses 
economic, political and legal dimensions that overlap with each other. Our understanding and 
assessment of economic integration is inextricably linked to the experience gained from the 
establishment, geographical expansion and extension of functions of the European Union (EU). 
Its development has been extensively researched in economics, political science, international 
relations, organizational sociology, and law. The present essay does not aim to survey any part of 
this enormous literature.
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 Rather, it offers some pointers on the issues regarding the following 
issues: setting–up of supranational structures that pursue collective objectives but in so doing may 
encroach on national sovereignty; determination of policy with multiple veto players; 
centralisation of policy making; market competition; the trade effects of a customs union; factor 
mobility; and adoption of a single currency, monetary and budgetary policy.  
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 For textbook expositions, see amongst others Senior Nello (2011), Baldwin and Wplosz 
(2012) and Saurugger (2013). Detailed analysis of monetary integration can be found in Issing 
(2008) and De Grauwe (2012). The interested reader is also referred to the papers in the volume 
edited by Artis and Nixson (2007). 
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2 European Economic Integration 
Construction of the EU started after the end of Second World War and is ongoing. Table 1 
presents a brief timeline of landmark events in the development of the EU. To complete the 
economic union a number of intermediate stages must be accomplished. 
(1) Duty–free access to each other nation’s market, which requires the abolition of tariffs and 
non–tariff restrictions on trade between the member–states.  
(2) Implementation of a common tariff on trade with non member–states to prevent cheaper 
imports entering the market through members–states with lower external tariffs, known as a 
customs union.  
(3) Establishment of a free market in goods and services among the member–states to ensure 
competition; this requires the harmonization of national laws and practices that regulate the 
market (including the relevant taxes), the abolition of anti–competitive structures, and the 
prohibition of state aid or other preferential treatment by member–state governments to national 
firms. 
(4) Establishment of a free market in labour and capital, which is achieved by eliminating 
discriminatory treatment of workers on the basis of nationality, granting firms the right to 
establish in another member–state, and the removal of restrictions on capital flows.  
(5) Establishment of a monetary union where the member–states adopt a single currency, so that 
prices and trading in the single market will not be affected by national currency fluctuations; in 
turn a single currency requires establishing a union–wide central bank to conduct monetary 
policy.  
Each successive stage envelops its predecessor. Not all member–states participate in the monetary 
union, with Denmark, Sweden and the UK deciding to keep their national currencies, while 
countries that entered the union after the launch of the euro are expected to adopt the currency 
when their economies are ready to do so. A further step, one yet to be taken by the EU, is the fiscal 
union where taxes and transfers are decided centrally. It is however noted that contrary to the above 
checklist the EU has adopted a protective agricultural policy. Each successive step implies a certain 
loss of national sovereignty, as for example a common tariff prevents a country to decide its own 
external trade policy, or with a common currency a country can no longer implement an independent 
monetary policy.  
3 Institutions of EU governance 
After the horrors of two world wars in a space of twenty years, European economic integration 
was conceived as the form of international organization to bind together rival European powers, 
especially France and Germany, in order to prevent another war. That is, economic means were 
used to accomplish a political objective. What followed was a series of international treaties that 
over time established an intricate system of Europe–wide governance (control of decision 
making), changed the scope of national legislative powers and created a body of legal acts and 
court decisions (known as the “acquis communautaire”) by which all member–states abide, while 
on the economic side it has shaped industry structures, wholesale and retail markets, labour 
markets, trade, investment and monetary flows.  
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Table 1. The evolution of the EU at a glance 
1952 Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany form The 
European Coal and Steel Community 
1957 The Six sign  The Rome Treaties are signed forming The European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)  
1966 The Luxembourg Compromise is accepted, permitting member states to demand 
legislation to be adopted by unanimity when very important interests are at stake 
1967 The three Communities are united as “European Communities” 
1973 Britain, Ireland and Denmark join 
1978 The European Monetary system and the European Currency Unit are founded 
1981 Greece joins 
1986 Spain and Portugal join 
1986 The Single European Act is adopted creating the Single Market 
1990 Eastern Germany joins after German reunification 
1992 The Maastricht Treaty is signed creating the European Union  
1995 Austria, Sweden and Finland join 
1997 The Amsterdam Treaty is signed amending the Maastricht Treaty 
1998 The European Central Bank (ECB) is set up 
1999 The Euro currency is created by irrevocably locking the exchange rates of participating 
countries and monetary policy making is transferred to the ECB 
2000 The Nice Treaty is signed amending earlier treaties 
2002 The “euro” becomes the sole currency of 12 out of 15 members (Britain, Sweden and 
Denmark retain their national currencies) 
2004 Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania,  
Estonia, Malta, and (the Greek part of) Cyprus join 
2004 The Rome Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is signed 
2005 Dutch and French voters reject the 2004 Treaty on Constitution; EU leaders suspend 
its ratification 
2007 Bulgaria and Romania join 
2007 The Treaty of Lisbon is signed amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community 
2009 Treaty of Lisbon enters into force after ratification is completed 
2013 Croatia joins 
 
Establishment of the EU by independent states meant the voluntary “pooling of sovereignty” to 
promote common interests and international public goods, like peace and prosperity, that are best 
pursued jointly rather than individually by each country. This also necessitated setting up bodies 
of collective decision making to pursue the common objectives, and simultaneously governance 
mechanisms to check that the new bodies will act within the agreed limits without infringing on 
the rights of their creators. The main institutions established to drive and administer the process 
of integration are the following.  
The European Council which consists of the leaders of the EU countries; it sets the EU's general 
political direction and priorities and deals with complex and sensitive issues that cannot be 
resolved at a lower level of intergovernmental cooperation. It meets four times a year and is 
chaired by the President of the European Council. The President of the European Commission 
and the EU High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also take part in the 
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meetings. The decisions of the European Council are taken by unanimity or by qualified majority, 
depending on what the EU Treaty provides for. Though influential in setting the EU political 
agenda, it has no powers to pass laws. 
The Council of the European Union (not to be confused with the previous European Council), 
also informally known as the EU Council or Council of Ministers, which brings together national 
ministers from each EU country to: pass EU laws; coordinate the broad economic policies of EU 
member countries; sign agreements between the EU and other countries; approve the annual EU 
budget; develop the EU's foreign and defence policies; and coordinate cooperation between 
courts and police forces of member countries. As a general rule the Council of the EU decides by 
qualified majority voting. From November 2014 a system known as 'double majority voting' will 
be introduced. For a proposal to go through, it will need the support of 2 types of majority: a 
majority of countries (at least 15) and a majority of the total EU population (the countries in 
favour must represent at least 65% of the EU population). A blocking minority must include at 
least four Council members; if the latter fails the qualified majority shall be deemed attained. 
When sensitive issues are decided, for example, security and external affairs and taxation, 
decisions have to be unanimous rendering veto powers to every single country. The Council of 
the EU represents the interests of the national governments of the member– states. 
The European Commission, which proposes policy measures, manages the day–to–day business 
of implementing EU policies and spending EU funds and represents the EU internationally. It is 
an executive supranational body that represents the Community interests. It consists of 28 
Commissioners one from each country serving for a renewable term of 5 years. The President and 
members of the Commission are appointed by the European Council. 
The European Parliament, which in an embryonic form represents directly the interests of the 
peoples of Europe. Its role is to debate and pass laws in combination with the Council; debate and 
adopt the budget of the EU; and scrutinise other EU institutions. Its members are directly elected 
for terms of five years. Their number is 751 including its President; there is a minimum threshold 
of 6 members per country and a maximum of 96 (implying that smaller countries weigh higher in 
its composition). The members are grouped according to political affiliation and not by 
nationality. In comparison to national parliaments it has significantly fewer legislative powers, 
but its powers have increased dramatically over time. It decides by simple majority. 
The Court of Justice, whose task is to examine the legality of European Union measures and ensure 
the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. It consists of one judge per EU country and 
eight ‘advocates–general’ whose job is to present opinions on the cases brought before the Court. 
Its members are appointed upon the common accord of the governments of the member–states for 
renewable six–year terms. By far the largest part of the workload of the ECJ is to hear direct 
actions and give preliminary rulings. Direct actions concern violations of EU law and include 
enforcement actions, where the Court declares whether or not a member state has infringed or 
complied with EU law; actions for judicial review, where the Court may annul an act of an EU 
institution for violating EU law or for failing to make decisions required of them; and actions for 
damages, where the Court may determine the liability of an EU institution. In preliminary rulings, 
the Court on the request of a national court interprets a point of EU law; this way it ensures the 
uniform interpretation of EU legislation. 
The European Central Bank; it has been set up to manage the euro and maintain price stability in 
the EU.  More specifically, its tasks are the determination and implementation of monetary 
policy by setting key interest rates for the 17 countries that currently use the euro as their 
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currency (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia); the conduct of foreign 
exchange operations; the holding and management of the official foreign reserves of the euro area 
countries; and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. The ECB is also 
responsible for framing and implementing the EU’s economic and monetary policy. It is 
politically independent of the governments of the member–states.  
In comparing the role of the nation–states vis–à–vis that of the supranational bodies established to 
pursue and administer the objectives of European integration, two competing schools of thought 
appeared, namely, intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.  Intergovernmentalism argues 
that the process of integration is controlled by the national governments of the member–states 
which impose the policies that best suit their interests; hence, the institutions of international 
governance set up by the treaties serve the purposes of their creators, usually the most powerful 
of the founding states, like France and Germany. On the contrary, supranationalism, or 
federalism, argues that economic integration, exchange and co-operation across national borders 
generated a new trans–national community whose interests are best served by setting institutional 
structures with some autonomous policy making powers previously reserved for the nation–state.  
4 Determination of policy with multiple veto players  
The previous description of the governance organs makes clear that policy making in the EU is a 
complicated matter involving the strategic interaction of multiple players, where strategic means 
that the action of an actor takes into account the expected response of another actor whose 
interests are affected by such actions. The interests of the national and supranational actors may 
not necessarily coincide on all issues at hand, and whereas only the Commission has agenda–
setting powers to initiate legislation, decisions are subject to the veto power of the Council, the 
Parliament (a process known as co–decision), and, as practice has shown, the Court.  
The qualified majority voting rule used by the EU (in approximately 80% of all its decisions), in 
combination with its supranational character raises a host of important issues: The first regards 
efficiency in decision making, which relates to how easy it is for the EU as a collective group to 
take a decision. This is the question of how likely is to find a majority given the specific voting 
rule and the distance between the policy preferences of the national and supranational actors. In 
general the answer depends on the required majority, the number of countries and the weight 
(number of votes) of each country. Second, the distribution of power among member–states 
which is approximated by the weight awarded to each member–state in the Council of Ministers. 
In the EU the countries with small populations, like Luxembourg, have been given greater 
weights than the more populous countries, like Germany. This goes a long way to explain the 
observed pattern of EU spending in favour of less populous countries. The third issue regards 
legitimacy of EU. A decision is legitimate when it is accepted that the decision maker has the 
right to take that decision. At one extreme, if the EU is considered as a union of states, as in a 
confederation, then legitimacy requires one vote per state. At the other extreme, if it is a union of 
peoples, then legitimacy requires equal power per citizen entitling more populous countries with 
increasing voting weight in the Council. Historically the union–of–the peoples approach has been 
the EU norm since more populous states have a larger voting weight.  
5 Centralization v decentralization of policy making  
Economic integration requires that some policies are decided by the supranational institutions, 
“the central authority”, and a common policy applies to all member–states. Examples include 
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external tariff, market competition, environmental protection, monetary policy – if a single 
currency is adopted, financial regulation and even some aspects of budgetary policy. This 
“harmonisation” of policy opens up the debate of the merits of centralisation versus 
decentralisation. When the member–states have different preferences for those policies but are 
forced to consume a greater (or smaller as the case may be) level of the service than it would have 
been optimal given their preferences when acting independently, a welfare loss results. This is 
depicted in Figure 1 which shows the demand for a public service by 2 countries 1 and 2, D1 and 
D2 respectively, when the supply (marginal cost) of provision is C. Under decentralisation the two 
countries act independently and consume Q1 and Q2 corresponding to the intersection of demand 
and supply. When they form a union, the central authority equates average demand   to supply 
and provides the same quantity QE to both 1 and 2. Since Q1 < QE < Q2, that is, country 1 over–
consumes and country 2 under–consumes the public service, centralisation generates the welfare 
losses measured respectively by the decrease in consumer surplus EB1E1 and EB2E2. Such losses 
depend on the diversity of preferences and the elasticity of demand (the distance between the 
demand curves and their slopes respectively). Had the central authority the relevant information 
about the different preferences in the two countries, it would have been able to provide them with 
the individually optimal levels of the service; in the latter case however, there would be no reason 
to form a union and  centralise policy making.  
Q1 QE
D2
D1
C
D
Quantity
Marginal 
Cost 
Figure 1: Diversity of preferences, economies of scale  and welfare of centralisation
C’
QN
Welfare gain of Country 1 at N: CB1G1C’–G1NN1
Welfare gain of Country 2 at N: CB2N2F2–N2NG2
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B1 B2
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N1
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G2
NG1
F2
E
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A second argument in favour of decentralisation relates to the political benefits it offers. 
Specifically, citizens of independent states can choose their own government, so that they have 
the incentive and opportunity to make informed decisions about policies that affect them and they 
exercise more effective control over the discretionary powers of politicians. This way the political 
principal–agent problem is mitigated and accountability of politicians to voters is improved. In 
response to this issue the EU has adopted the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
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Subsidiarity means that a policy is assigned to the supranational (=central) authorities when it 
cannot be achieved by the national authorities. According to proportionality the content and form 
of EU action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. 
By contrast, the arguments in favour of centralisation underline the benefits from economies of 
scale, correction of externalities and elimination of inefficient non co–operative behaviour. 
Centralisation often involves significant economies of scale where increasing all inputs by the 
same proportion increases output more than proportionally and costs rise more slowly than 
output, resulting in important gains for the consumer. Graphically, the presence of economies of 
scale that are exploited under centralisation yields a supply curve at C’, lower than C. The new 
equilibrium obtained by the intersection of C’ and   is denoted by point N yields a larger 
equilibrium quantity for the two countries QN > QE. The gains from cost savings for country 1 and 
2 are shown respectively by the areas CB1G1C’ and CB2N2F2 and the corresponding losses from 
over – and under – consumption are represented by the triangles NN1G1 and NG2N2. Thus, the net 
welfare gains from centralization for 1 and 2 are given by the differences CB1G1C’–NN1G1 and 
CB2N2F2–N2G2N. 
Centralised decision making is also better equipped to address problems of positive or negative 
externalities (or spillovers), that is, situations where actions taken in one country (like burning 
fossil fuels, or fishing) may increase or decrease the welfare of another country. However, the 
presence of externalities does not necessitate centralization, since such problems can be addressed 
by cooperation between the parties concerned. A third argument in favour of centralization is its 
ability to avoid non–cooperative behavior by different countries. Countries competing against 
each other to attract business and mobile factors of production in their territories, which in turn 
increase the tax basis, may engage in games of competitive tax rate reductions (or other cost–
cutting incentives, like relaxation of health and safety standards at the workplace) ultimately 
resulting in lower taxes and lower welfare in what is referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’, that is, 
the lowest tax rate or protection for the workforce. 
6 Trade and growth effects of economic integration  
The economic rationale of integration among sovereign nations is that it promotes trade and 
growth and hence it increases welfare. In the short–run abolition of trade barriers allows 
economies to specialise according to their comparative advantage which increases the volume of 
trade; however against such benefits one must set the costs from trade protection measures 
against non – members. These static effects of economic integration for an importing country are 
sketched in Figure 2.  
The lines DD, SD and PW denote respectively the domestic demand for the imported good, the 
domestic supply and the world supply at the exogenously given PW price. When the country 
applies a tariff to imports from all countries the domestic price rises to PT domestic supply and 
demand are shown by OQ1 and OQ2, imports by Q1Q2 and import expenditure by Q1HJQ2. When 
a trade union is formed with a partner country that excludes other countries, domestic supply is 
represented by the line SD+SP and equilibrium is obtained at E where DD intersects SD+SP. 
Domestic demand rises to OQ4, domestic supply falls to OQ3 implying the larger Q3Q4 volume of 
imports. Consumer welfare has increased by the sum ACF+BEG; this represents the gain from 
lowering the import price and is known as the trade creation effect. However, the Q1Q2 imports 
now enter the country at the PP rather than PW price paid to the partner country implying that the 
expenditure on Q1Q2 is HJGF. This is known as the trade diversion effect. Thence, the net welfare 
effect of forming the union is ACF + BEG – HJGF, which can be positive or negative. In other 
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words, it is not a priori clear whether the preferential trade arrangement will benefit or harm the 
country–members.  
PP
O
SD+SP
PW
F
Quantity
SD
DD
Price
PT
Q1 Q2Q3 Q4
G
A B
C E
H J
Figure 2: Trade and Welfare Effects of a Customs Union
Net welfare effect of preferential trade: ACF + BEG – HJGF
 
The effect of factor mobility is shown in Figure 3 using the example of capital mobility. Assume 
again a two – country setting, where the capital endowment of country 1 and 2 respectively are 
O1K0 and K0O2 (giving a total capital stock of O1O2 as shown on the horizontal axis). Lines 
MPK1 and MPK2 show the marginal productivity of capital in the two nations (or equivalently, 
the national demand functions for capital), and R1 and R2 show the return on capital in the two 
countries before capital market integration, with R1 > R2. The areas defined by the MPK curves, 
the axis and the individual capital endowments, O1A1B1K0 and O2A2B2K0, show the outputs of the 
country 1 and 2 respectively. A1B1R1 and O1R1B1K0 represent the sizes of labour and capital 
income in country 1, and A2B2R2 and O2R2B2K0 show the corresponding magnitudes in country 2. 
When capital markets are integrated, capital flows freely from the low return country 2 to the 
high return country 1 until returns are equalized at R* at the intersection of MPK1 and MPK2; 
country 1 ends up using domestically capital O1K* (although it owns OK0), total output equal to 
O1A1EK* and labour income A1ER* (higher than before by R1B1ER*. In country 2, output falls 
to O2A2EK*, labour income falls to A2ER* and capital income rises to O2R*CK0 (upon adding 
the capital earnings from capital owned by country 2 but used in 1). Thus the net effect of 
integration is a gain represented by B1EB2, which is the sum of the extra labour income in country 
1, B1EC, and the extra capital income in country 2, B2EC. Clearly, although the overall 
integration has a positive effect on welfare, it creates winners and losers in each country, who 
may resist it with various degree of success depending on their political influence. Similar 
conclusions about increased output and its differential distribution are derived when we consider 
the labour market and allow immigration from a low wage to a high wage country.  
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Marginal  Productivity of Capital in Country 1
(left – hand axis) 
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C
Figure 3:  The effects of Factor Mobility
MPK MPK
Capital
Net welfare gains from capital market integration: B1EC + B2EC
 
Over the long–run, integration implies that firms have access to a larger union–wide market and 
that they face stiffer competition than when they were confined to their national market only. As 
a result of more competition, costs and profit margins are squeezed and prices fall. Firms that 
survive become bigger and better able to exploit economies of scale driving prices further down 
to the benefit of consumer. The benefits of the restructuring process, however, are at risk from 
two sources. National governments bowing to political pressures may subsidise and otherwise 
assist failing firms delaying the efficient restructuring of the economy. Secondly, the emergence 
of fewer but bigger firms may lead to price collusion negating the benefits of lower prices for 
consumers. It is for these reasons that the EU has introduced strict rules forbidding state aid and 
enforcing competition. Since integration encourages a more efficient allocation of resources, 
human and non–human, labour and capital are allocated more efficiently across different 
countries boosting the rate of economic growth.  
7 Monetary union  
Monetary union or monetary integration is an arrangement between participating countries where the 
exchange rates are permanently and irrevocably fixed, so that a single currency can be used by all 
members. Several benefits are associated with the adoption of a single currency. (a) The elimination 
of exchange rate fluctuations and the ensuing uncertainty which discourages trade and investment. 
(b) Reduction in transaction costs relating to conversion fees and commission charges incurred when 
exchanging different currencies. (c) Seignorage gains from establishing the single currency as an 
international reserve currency; these arise from the willingness of the rest of the world to hold the 
single currency as an asset which then allows the monetary union to import more than it exports. (d) 
Reduction in the opportunity cost of keeping foreign reserves, since the union needs fewer reserves 
to manage its currency than the sum of reserves needed by each member–state acting independently. 
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(e) Greater effectiveness in pursuing aggregate stabilisation policy. While many small open 
economies acting on their own cannot implement successful short-run aggregate demand 
management policies because of their dependence on international trade, a union can succeed by 
coordinating policy among member–states. (f) For countries characterized by high inflation before 
the formation of the monetary union (like Italy or Greece) adopting a single currency managed by a 
central bank which is committed to price stability introduces a credible anti–inflationary assurance 
(or so the argument ran before the debt crisis of 2010). 
However, such benefits may be accompanied by severe costs: giving up monetary policy 
independence and adopting the single currency imply that a country can no longer use the exchange 
rate to counteract demand and / or supply shocks. When domestic prices and wages are slow to 
adjust to such shocks, using the exchange rate can be used to adjust domestic demand and supply to 
re–establish macroeconomic equilibrium quickly. With a floating exchange rate system, the 
exchange rate will adjust to maintain balance of payments equilibrium; monetary policy becomes 
effective to affect the domestic economy, but fiscal policy becomes ineffective (because capital will 
move in and out of the country responding to domestic and foreign interest rate differentials). On the 
other hand, under a fixed exchange rate regime the authorities must respond to a surplus by reflating 
and to a deficit by deflating; thus monetary policy becomes ineffective, while fiscal policy is now 
effective. These considerations point to the “impossible trinity” of having simultaneously a fixed 
exchange rate, independent monetary policy and perfect capital mobility. 
Whether or not a group of countries will benefit from forming a monetary union has been 
examined by the “Optimal Currency Area” (OCA) literature. This starts from the observation that 
the larger the area using the same currency, the larger its benefits; but as the area grows larger it 
includes more diverse countries, which increases the costs of using the currency. Specifically, in 
the face of an adverse external shock that affects different countries differently (small economic 
losses for some but large for others), a single central bank cannot differentiate its policy responses 
according to the needs of the different countries. Asymmetric costs may deter the formation of a 
currency union. A group of countries can form a successful OCA when the following conditions 
are satisfied: (a) The labour force is mobile across the different countries. (b) The countries have 
diversified economies and produce and export similar goods. (c) The countries are open to 
international trade with each other. (d) They have adopted a mechanism of fiscal transfers that 
compensate each other for adverse economic shocks. (e) They share common preferences on how 
to respond to an external shock. (f) Perhaps more importantly, since none of the previous criteria 
may be fully satisfied, the countries have a sense of solidarity that their fates bound them together 
and so accept the costs of asymmetric shocks. 
When countries lose the exchange rate as a policy instrument they can use fiscal means to counteract 
any adverse shocks to aggregate demand, especially if fiscal transfers are not feasible – see (d) 
above. Despite the efficacy of discretionary fiscal policy in a system of fixed exchange rates, its 
use by member–states of an economic union with a single currency is controversial. Acting 
independently, a member–state running persistent large budget deficits adding to national debt 
may face severe difficulties. To bail out the highly indebted country the central bank may 
increase the money supply, bringing inflation and depreciation of the single currency. 
Alternatively, debt accumulation may lead to higher interest rates for all country members 
crowding out private investment. If capital markets are efficient and assess the default risks of 
different governments, they will demand significantly higher interest on the debt of the profligate 
government without a general interest rate increase. But if high indebtedness leads to fears about the 
financial stability of other countries, the commitment of the central bank to low inflation may no 
longer be believed, implying that the policy of no bail outs for fiscal profligacy lacks credibility. 
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Accordingly, the risk of default is lower than otherwise. This generates a moral hazard problem 
where a member–state has an incentive for spending profligacy. Note that there may even be an 
adverse selection problem where only the worst offenders (those who run the biggest budgetary 
deficits, like Italy and Greece) are interested in joining the monetary union. In the present state of 
the play, these questions seem far from settled.  
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